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This article explores the relationship between the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
the relative labor market outcomes for people with disabilities. Using individual-level longitudinal data from 1981 to 1996 derived from the previously unexploited Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID), we examine the possible effect of the ADA on (1) annual weeks
worked; (2) annual earnings; and (3) hourly wages for a sample of 7,120 unique male
household heads between the ages of 21 and 65, as well as for a subset of 1,437 individuals
appearing every year from 1981 to 1996. Our analysis of the larger sample suggests the ADA
had a negative impact on the employment levels of disabled persons relative to nondisabled
persons but no impact on relative earnings. However, our evaluation of the restricted sample
raises questions about these findings. Using these data, we find little evidence of adverse
effects on weeks worked but strong evidence of wage declines for the disabled, albeit
declines beginning in 1986, well before the ADA’s passage. These results therefore cast
doubt on the adverse ADA-related impacts found in previous studies, particularly Acemoglu
and Angrist (2001). The conflicting narratives that emerge from our analysis shed new light
on, but also counsel caution in reaching final conclusions about, the impact of the ADA on
employment outcomes for people with disabilities.

I. Introduction
Research on the measurable effects of antidiscrimination initiatives indicates that numerous factors can impact the efficacy of civil rights statutes seeking to equalize opportunities
for targeted groups.1 Gerald Rosenberg (1991), for example, has argued that judicial
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Professor of Law, Stanford Law School; Stein is Executive Director, Harvard Law School Project on Disability and
Cabell Research Professor, William & Mary School of Law; Becker is at UC Berkeley School of Law and is a Ph.D.
candidate in jurisprudence and social policy.
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1
In this article, efficacy is calibrated using econometrically measurable outcomes. An interesting issue is whether a
narrow focus on the measured wages and employment data fully captures important but harder to quantify effects
relating to the overarching purpose of civil rights laws in transforming social attitudes. For a discussion of this broader
issue within the context of disability law, see Stein (2004b).
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decisions alone were incapable of generating the major economic improvements for
African Americans that emerged around 1965. These economic gains were not simply the
byproduct of judicial decisions following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but
were instead generated by a comprehensive federal government enforcement effort, concentrated in the South, of related antidiscrimination policies that included voting rights
and school desegregation (Butler & Heckman 1977; Donohue & Heckman 1991; Heckman
& Payner 1989).
A key congressional aspiration in enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
was increasing labor market participation among disabled workers. In addition to prohibiting discriminatory action throughout the employment relationship, Title I compels
employers to provide reasonable accommodations to “qualified” employees with disabilities.2 This reasonable accommodation mandate has become both a central defining feature
of the ADA as an antidiscrimination statute for its advocates (Stein 2004a) and a lightning
rod for its critics (Epstein 1992).
The ADA set forth legislative findings documenting the widespread exclusion of
people with disabilities from the workplace and expressing congressional intent to
remedy that situation. But both congressional and judicial support for the effort to incorporate the disabled more fully into the workforce has not been consistent and comprehensive throughout the existence of the ADA (Stein & Stein 2007).3 Indeed, for the first
10 years after the ADA’s passage, the effectiveness of the statue was undercut by federal
benefits rules that penalized disabled workers who secured employment by depriving
them of their federal health-care benefits or monetary supplements.4 Moreover, Congress
has yet to enact a comprehensive jobs program for workers with disabilities similar to
those passed for nondisabled benefit recipients during the mid-1990s welfare reform.5
Finally, while Congress did enact federal tax benefits designed to increase the employment of persons with disabilities, these tax credits have been profoundly underutilized
(GAO 2002).
A growing debate has developed regarding the impact of the ADA on the employment of individuals with disabilities. Initial empirical studies comparing pre- and post-ADA

2
To be considered qualified, individuals must be capable of performing the essential job functions of the positions
they seek, either with or without the provision of reasonable accommodations. For an overview of the reasonable
accommodation mandate, see Stein (2003).

3
This disregard led Richard Burkhauser to criticize the ADA’s lack of conjoined work initiatives by contrasting various
European policies directed toward “transferring” people with disabilities from social welfare networks into the
workforce (Burkhauser 1997; Burkhauser & Hirvonen 1989).

4
The Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 extended the length of time that people with
disabilities receiving public assistance could continue to receive health-care coverage after obtaining gainful employment. On July 26, 2000 (the ADA’s 10th anniversary), the Clinton Administration announced a series of policy
initiatives to allow disabled people receiving Social Security disability-related benefits to earn additional income
without losing cash benefits.

5
For a description of one of the failed efforts to enact a federal jobs program for the disabled by one of its
congressional supporters, see Dole (1994).
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employment data have painted a fairly dismal picture of disabled employees’ labor market
participation, suggesting that the law may actually have impaired the employment prospects
of its intended beneficiaries. Some recent studies have raised questions about this dire
assessment, although both sides concede that post-ADA disability-related employment has
not improved significantly.
Achieving a greater understanding of post-ADA employment effects is of considerable importance both within and outside the United States. Notably, the ADA’s reasonable
accommodation mandate has been adopted by the UN Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities,6 as well as the EU Employment Framework Directive (an umbrella
antidiscrimination policy) (European Union Council 2000). These enactments have
considerably broadened interest in disability law and policy, although it should still be
noted that three-quarters of the world’s nations lack any relevant domestic statute or legal
provision protecting the disabled from employment discrimination (Stein & Lord 2008).
This article reexamines the impact of the ADA on the employment and wages of
disabled workers. We contribute to the literature in two important ways. First, we expand
the period of observation to understand long-term trends in the employment status of the
disabled. Second, unlike many of the earlier studies, we employ individual-level panel data
to observe the same individuals before and after the adoption of the ADA. Expanding the
timeframe and utilizing the longitudinal structure of our data improves our ability to
identify the true impact of the ADA by controlling for preexisting trends and compositional
changes in the disabled population. At the same time, there is a cost to our approach since
the size of our Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data set is small relative to the
Current Population Survey (CPS), and when we restrict our sample to the same 1,437 male,
household-head workers over a 16-year data period, we sacrifice some statistical power to
reduce compositional bias.
To frame our discussion, Section II discusses the results of major studies on post-ADA
employment effects as well as data-related pitfalls left unaddressed in the literature. Section
III sets forth our initial analysis from the PSID, a longitudinal data set that, to our knowledge, has not been previously used to explore Title I’s impact on the employment of the
disabled. These data are unique in their ability to track the same individuals over time, from
1968 through 2007.7 Unlike the more frequently used CPS, PSID data allow us to chart the
measured employment and earnings of the same disabled workers over a broader span of
time. Section IV presents the results from our regression-based analysis without imposing
any extraordinary constraints on the data. We find that employment levels for the disabled
relative to the nondisabled (when measured as the number of annual weeks worked)
declined by about three weeks after 1994 (when Title I became fully enforceable) but that
earnings (conditional on receipt) were not measurably affected. Section V adds the condition that individuals represented in the sample remain the same over time so that longitudinal estimates are perfectly comparable. Using this “restricted” data set, we observe that

6

For an overview of the treaty and its implications, see Stein (2007).

7
The PSID maintains annual family-level data files from the program’s inception in 1968 through 1997, after which
they appear biennially through 2007.
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the initial estimates are highly sensitive to whether one controls for individual fixed effects.
Without such controls (see Column 1 in Table 6), a picture of substantial relative declines
in weeks worked by the disabled emerges in the 1990s; with such controls, no such employment decline appears.
These results are important for several reasons. First, they reinforce the growing
evidence that econometric analyses of law and policy can yield quite different results
across different data sets, years, and statistical models (Donohue & Wolfers 2005). Second,
we argue that the longitudinal data contained in the PSID reduce the confounding effect
of compositional change, that is, who self-identifies as “disabled” after disability laws
change. In this regard, our approach can provide a cleaner estimate of the impact of the
law on a given panel of workers over an extended period of time. This benefit does come
at the cost of our diminished ability to observe the performance of younger disabled
workers entering the market at about the time of the adoption of the ADA, as well as make
for a relatively small sample size.8 Finally, this article underscores the challenge confronting policymakers in crafting a disability policy that addresses the difficult conditions
confronting disabled male household heads in the modern U.S. economy. Section VI
concludes.

II. Previous Studies
A. Prior Literature
Eighteen years after the ADA’s passage, most scholars agree that the employment rates of
disabled workers have declined, although there is still contention over the extent of and
reasons for this outcome. Some attribute the drop to the ADA itself and, in particular, to its
reasonable accommodation mandate (Jolls & Prescott 2005; Acemoglu & Angrist 2001;
DeLeire 2000a, 2000b; Jolls 2000; Epstein 1992). A second group attributes the decline to
factors other than the ADA (Hotchkiss 2003, 2004; Houtenville & Burkhauser 2004;
Burkhauser & Stapleton 2004; Wittenberg & Maag 2003; Beegle & Stock 2003; Autor &
Duggan 2003; Blanck et al. 2003; Tolin & Patwell 2003; Kaye 2003; Bound & Waidmann
2002; Burkhauser et al. 2001; McNeil 2000; Schwochau & Blanck 2000).9
The ADA includes two key employment-related provisions: a prohibition on wage and
employment discrimination against “qualified individuals with a disability” and a mandate
that employers provide “reasonable accommodation” for those protected individuals in

8
The PSID does add new individuals to the overall “roster”; for example, the children of original 1968 interviewed
household heads. Our unrestricted data set generates some compositional change as older workers drop out of our
sample, but to be included in any given year’s coefficient estimate, one must have a 1981 observation for comparison,
so we are not adding new workers at the time of ADA adoption. Our restricted data set, however, focuses on a static
group of individuals, that is, those who appear each year from 1981 through 1996.

9
Several studies, which are referenced individually, are collected in Stapleton and Burkhauser (2003). Two important
articles predating the post-ADA effect studies are Collignon (1997) and Kirchner (1996). Electronic versions of some
of these studies, as well as continuing research in this field, are posted on the Cornell University ILR School
Employment and Disability Institute homepage, <http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/edi/m-pubs.cfm>.
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order to guarantee equal employment opportunities. Although a number of studies have
found that pre-1990 civil rights laws increased the employment of the primary targeted
group (e.g., African-American workers), those laws involved only an antidiscrimination
component and did not include a reasonable accommodation requirement (Heckman &
Payner 1989; Donohue & Heckman 1991). Consequently, when initial evaluations of
relative post-ADA employment rates concluded that the law impaired the employment of
workers with disabilities, the reasonable accommodation mandate was quickly identified
as the likely culprit.
Three major empirical studies have been central to the claim that the ADA’s reasonable accommodation mandate has caused a relative decrease in the post-ADA employment
rate of persons with disabilities.10 Initially, DeLeire (2000a) examined the effect of the ADA
on labor market opportunities for people with disabilities using data from the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Analyzing pooled panels of men aged 18 to 64,
DeLeire found that employment of disabled men declined by about 7.2 percentage points
from 1990 to 1995 and that the largest declines occurred “for workers in manufacturing
industries, workers in blue-collar or managerial occupations, workers with physical or
mental disabilities, and workers who became disabled for reasons besides a work-related
injury.” However, he did not find any effect on the wages offered to disabled men.
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) also investigated whether the intended employment
protection of the ADA improved economic conditions for the disabled. Using CPS survey
data for individuals aged 21 to 58 during the period 1988–1997, Acemoglu and Angrist
estimated the effect of the ADA on both weeks worked and log weekly earnings. For women
and men under 40, they found an average annual decline in employment beginning in
1993 and 1992, respectively, ranging from 1.4 to 2.8 weeks. For those over 40, however, only
men experienced a statistically significant drop in employment of 2.1 weeks. However,
these effects for older men were attributed to changes in transfer payments and disappeared once Supplementary Security Income (SSI) and Social Security Disability Insurance
(SSDI) were included in the analysis. The wage regressions were more ambiguous: no
consistent effect emerged for women, while the decline for men after 1993 disappeared
when a linear trend was included.
Although the articles by DeLeire and Acemoglu and Angrist are serious and careful
studies by highly respected researchers, the authors faced the difficult challenge of identifying the effect of a uniformly imposed federal law such as the ADA using a simple
before-after comparison in the employment experience of disabled individuals (Donohue
& Heckman 1991). By contrast, Jolls and Prescott (2005) attempted an alternative approach
based on variations in disability law both across states and over time, thereby permitting a
more nuanced assessment of treatment and control groups. Although they found a steady
decline in employment levels among disabled workers during the 1990s relative to the
period before the ADA’s passage, Jolls and Prescott’s work revealed no connection between
declines from 1993–1994 and onward and whether the federal law was an innovation over

10

Two other studies that bear noting are Epstein (1992), which foretold a detrimental effect in advance of the ADA
becoming operational, and Jolls (2000), which analyzed Epstein’s assertions using a price-theoretic framework.
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preexisting state law protections. Any adverse outcomes for the disabled population were
confined to the immediate postpassage period, before the ADA’s effective date, before
employers’ attitudes about workers with disabilities could improve, and before the courts
had defined more precisely the ADA’s requirements. Hotchkiss (2004) also exploited
state-level variation in disability protection law to conclude that the ADA was not responsible for declining labor force participation rates among the disabled.
These leading studies assessing relative post-ADA employment rates using SIPP and
CPS data all reached the same conclusion that the statute has precipitated a decline in
employment levels, although Jolls and Prescott found this effect to be limited to the short
term. Moreover, all three studies (again, with Jolls and Prescott’s caveat regarding shortand long-term effects) concluded that the ADA’s reasonable accommodation mandate is
the most likely cause of the relative decline in employment.
More recent work, such as Burkhauser et al. (2007), has raised questions about
whether the observed decline in the employment of the disabled can be attributed to the
ADA. Burkhauser and his co-authors extend and refine the analysis of Acemoglu and
Angrist in several important ways. After expanding the observation period from 1988–1997
to 1982–2004, Burkhauser et al. conclude that the “decline in relative employment of
working-age people with disabilities not only began well before the implementation of the
ADA in 1992, but has continued long afterward.”
B. Identifying Disabled Individuals
When assessing the ADA’s impact, it is crucial to have a reliable measure of disability. Yet,
since the enactment of the ADA, federal courts on numerous occasions have redefined who
is covered by the statute.11 Accordingly, it is unsurprising that no clear and consistent
measure exists of the disabled individuals protected by the ADA.12 The CPS studies discussed above all use the survey’s responses to the work-disability question as a proxy for
disability.13 This fact, in turn, raises several concerns, since the problems surrounding
the work-disability question and similar survey questions have long been recognized
(Hale 2001).
To begin with, the CPS work-disability question was not intended to correspond to
the definition of disability under the ADA (McNeil 2000). In addition, it is at least possible
that the composition of respondents who answer affirmatively to the work-disability question changes over time in ways that would undermine the reliability of estimates of the
effect of the law (Kirchner 1996; Kruse & Schur 2003).

11

For a prominent example, see Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999).

12

See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999), in which the Supreme Court acknowledged the
potential overlap between individuals deemed disabled under the ADA and those construed as such under the Social
Security system.

13

The question is “Do you (Does anyone in this household) have a health problem or disability which prevents
(you/them) from working or which limits the kind or amount of work (you/they) can do?” and the possible answers
are “Yes” or “No.”
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One can imagine two ways the presence of the law could influence self-reports of
disability. On one hand, some nonworking individuals who did not previously identify
themselves as disabled might now choose to do so in the wake of the advent of the law. This
could result from either greater awareness of the concept of disability in the workplace, a
renewed sense that the disabled were discriminated against, or even hopes that recharacterizing oneself as disabled might lead to improved employment prospects once the law
takes effect. In this event, the “disabled” population would grow in a way that might be
disproportionately augmented by those with poor prospects in the labor market. The effect
of this changing composition of the disabled would likely make the law look worse than it
actually was.
On the other hand, the passage of the ADA could also lead to a reduction in the
number of those who self-reported as disabled. This effect would operate if the accommodation provision of the ADA led disabled people to reject the notion that their health
problem or disability prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount of work they
can do (Kirchner 1996). By having the people who receive accommodations under the ADA
drop out of the population that answers the work-disability question affirmatively, one is
potentially left with more severely disabled people who both have a harder time finding
employment and self-report a work disability. This compositional change would also bias
the analysis toward findings of declining employment of the disabled population, even if
there were a positive effect on employment from the ADA accommodation provision
(Kruse & Schur 2003).
C. The Possible Sources of Data—CPS, SIPP, and PSID
The studies discussed above have relied on either the CPS or the SIPP. Inevitably, different
data sources have advantages and disadvantages. To resolve deficiencies in the CPS, the U.S.
Census Bureau originally established the SIPP to capture economic conditions at multiple
times within a two-and-one-half-year window. This aspect of the data instrument also
relieved survey respondents from the task, required in the CPS, of remembering economic
values or participation levels from up to 12 months prior to the survey. But these advantages
of the SIPP are potentially offset in a study of disability in that SIPP interviewers ask
questions from the disability module only between June and September of the first year in
the panel window. Consequently, any changes in disability status that occur in months from
successive waves are not captured.14
The SIPP only modestly improves on the pure cross-sectional structure of the CPS in
terms of allowing the researcher to follow the same individuals across time. The PSID,
which provides longitudinal data over a significant timespan, represents a clear improvement in this dimension over the CPS and SIPP. Thus, it appears that clear tradeoffs exist
when choosing among the three primary data sets capturing individual disability and
employment status. The level of detail in the SIPP makes it more attractive than the vague
questions in the CPS and PSID. The SIPP’s major flaw in terms of disability reporting,

14

The SIPP will register an individual’s disability only if it existed before June–September of the first interview year
(depending on the rotation group to which the individual was assigned).
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however, is a failure to ask the question in the second and third years covered by each panel,
which compromises reporting accuracy. Only the PSID data allow for reliable monitoring of
individuals over time and thus for observing changes in disability status that may be
attributed to passage of the ADA (albeit with a vague question about disability). With these
advantages and disadvantages in mind, we turn to our study, which is the first evaluation of
the impact of the ADA to use the PSID.

III. Our Analysis Using PSID Data
The PSID data appear in two formats: a year-by-year family file in which most of the survey
questions pertain to the household head, and a cross-year individual file with information
on each household member. We create our data set by matching the individual-level file to
the family-level version for the years 1981–1997 and restricting observations to household
heads (because survey questions regarding most variables of interest, including disability
status, are asked only of the household head).15
Our initial matching algorithm yields longitudinal data for 18,342 individuals comprising 107,844 person-year observations. We then restrict this sample to male household
heads between the ages 21 and 65 to explore the labor market behavior of those most
persistently attached to the labor force.16 After imposing these restrictions, our operational
data set consists of 7,120 individuals observed in at least one year during the period 1981 to
1996 (a total of 64,607 person-year observations). Our analysis will compare white versus
nonwhite individuals.17
Tables 1 and 2 report summary statistics for two versions of the operational data
set: one for the overall “unrestricted” sample of 7,120 individuals and another describing
the “restricted” sample, the 1,437 individuals appearing each year from 1981 to 1996. The
PSID question used to identify disability status among heads of households is: “Do
you . . . have any physical or nervous condition that limits the type of work or the amount
of work you can do?”18 A c2 test for the equality of means in each sample indicates that

15

We are able to track household-head responses consistently across time by arranging a string of household interview
numbers in the individual-level set in chronological order and then merging these data with it.

16

Male household heads comprise about 75 percent of all household heads. We note that Richard Burkhauser and his
colleagues argue that PSID analysis should examine effects on men, “since their employment decline is much more
pronounced than that of women” (Burkhauser & Schroeder 2004). Also, “the PSID and the CPS, capture the same
employment trends for men with disabilities over the 1980s and 1990s” (Burkhauser & Schroeder 2004).

17

Responses to the race survey question often generate inconsistency over time; we therefore apply the response that
appears in more than half the individual’s total observations.

18

In another section of the PSID survey, however, the question posed is: “[A]re you . . . working now, looking for work,
retired, a student, (a housewife), or what?” The responses “temporarily disabled” or “permanently disabled” often are
coded, but were not suggested to interviewees as possible answers. The fact that interview participants are not
prompted to consider the answer “permanently disabled” implies a likely downward bias in the frequency of
affirmative disability reports. As a result, we ignore the employment status question as a measure of disability.
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Table 1:

Summary Statistics (Unrestricted Data Set)

Variable
Currently disabled
Currently employed
Annual weeks worked
Real annual wages (2000)
Real hourly wages (2000)
Age
White
Less than high school education
High school graduate
Some college education
College graduate
Some postgraduate study
State unemployment rate

Number of Observations

Mean

SD

64,525
64,601
56,465
63,629
48,832
64,607
64,607
64,607
64,607
64,607
64,607
64,607
63,190

0.13
0.85
40.79
31,055
17.29
39.16
0.70
0.20
0.37
0.21
0.14
0.08
6.78

0.34
0.36
16.94
36,151
33.30
11.20
0.46
0.40
0.48
0.40
0.35
0.27
1.98

Note: The incidence of disability is measured using the PSID’s work limitation question.
Sources: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1981–1996 and the U.S. Statistical Abstract for unemployment.

Table 2:

Summary Statistics (Restricted Data Set)

Variable
Currently disabled
Currently employed
Annual weeks worked
Real annual wages (2000)
Real hourly wages (2000)
Age
White
Less than high school education
High school graduate
Some college education
College graduate
Some postgraduate study
State unemployment rate

Number of Observations

Mean

SD

22,974
22,992
20,521
22,790
18,759
22,992
22,992
22,992
22,992
22,992
22,992
22,992
22,869

0.12
0.90
43.34
37,508
19.23
40.77
0.78
0.14
0.35
0.22
0.17
0.12
6.81

0.33
0.30
14.03
41,593
22.18
9.04
0.41
0.35
0.48
0.41
0.38
0.32
2.08

Note: The incidence of disability is measured using the PSID’s work limitation question.
Sources: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1981–1996 and the U.S. Statistical Abstract for unemployment.

the two groups are statistically indistinguishable with the sole exception of state unemployment rates, the difference between which is marginally different from 0 at the 5
percent level.
On average, the male household heads in our sample report being disabled 13
percent and 12 percent of the time in the unrestricted and restricted data sets, respectively.19 Note that this is different from the claim that 12–13 percent of the household heads

19

In this section, we refer to summary statistics from the unrestricted data in Table 1 unless otherwise noted.
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in our data are disabled, since, as we show, disability reports can vary over time for the same
individual. In the unrestricted (restricted) data, about 4,889 (884) people, or 69 percent
(62 percent) never report a disability, while only 21 individuals, or less than 1 percent,
report having a disability each year they appear in the restricted data set.
With respect to average employment, PSID interviewees held jobs 85 percent of the
time when the interview was conducted. This response variable reflects answers to a question about current employment status and, as a result, potentially understates the extent of
employment during the data collection year. The effects of relying on this variable for
analyzing the impact of the ADA in a multiple regression framework are discussed in the
next section. We therefore use an alternative measure of annual employment available in
the PSID survey: annual weeks worked, which is asked retrospectively of respondents.20 Over
the 16-year period of observation, individuals averaged approximately 41 weeks worked per
year. Converting nominal earnings to constant 2000 dollars, we find that (unconditional)
average annual wages and salaries amounted to just over $31,000, while the average real
hourly wage was approximately $17.
Turning to demographic characteristics, we find that 70 percent of the men in our
data set were white and that average age over the period 1981–1996 was 39 years. Thirtyseven percent of our sample had obtained only a high school degree, while another 21
percent attended some college, and another 14 percent had at least a college degree.
Finally, we collected data on unemployment rates to proxy for economic conditions in
each state in which PSID participants resided; the average across states and years was just
under 7 percent.
Figure 1 provides information on the percentage of individuals reporting a disability
over the duration of our observation period. Since natural aging and continuing exposure
to potentially disabling disease or injury will tend to drive this proportion upward, we
separate the data into three cohorts defined by age reported in 1981. As expected, the
disabled share in each cohort increases from 1981 to 1996, and the older initial cohorts
have higher rates of disability. Note that the share of disabled persons in the cohort aged
40 to 65 rises from roughly 20 percent to 30 percent by 1996. The cohorts aged 21 to 39, on
the other hand, begin with a much lower rate of disability, closer to 5 percent in 1981, rising
to 16 percent in the final year of observation.21
Figure 2 portrays the evolution of cohort disability shares when we fix the age groups
but allow their members to change over time at five-year intervals. If the relationship

20

Requiring interviewees to recall information on employment status and earnings from the previous year undoubtedly introduces measurement error (due, e.g., to reporting biases or imperfect recall). However, since these indicators are used as dependent variables in the analysis, such measurement error will not bias our estimates.

21

The older two cohorts experienced a dip in disability share in 1986 that we pursued with data analysts at the PSID.
According to one helpful representative, “[t]he only difference in 1986 compared to other waves is that [the work
limitation questions] were asked after a series of questions on Activities of Daily Living (‘ADLs’). This could be some
kind of measurement issue—asking a global questions about whether [one has] a physical or nervous condition that
limits the amount and type of work you do after . . . questions about whether you have ADLs somehow might reduce
the likelihood of [one] reporting affirmatively to the first question.” Indeed, this is the only difference in the way the
questions were asked from 1985 to 1987, and when the questions regarding ADLs were removed in 1987, the
percentage disabled returned to levels consistent with the year-to-year changes from 1981 to 1985.
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Figure 1: Percentage disabled by 1981 age cohort (1981–1996).

Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

Figure 2: Percentage disabled by age cohort in five-year intervals (1981–1996).

Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

between age and disability shifted significantly between 1981 and 1996, then our empirical
model should control for this phenomenon accordingly. However, all five curves in
Figure 2 suggest that disability shares were relatively constant comparing 1981 and 1996,
albeit with some intervening swings over time within each cohort. The biggest shifts across
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Figure 3: Percentage employed by disability status (1981–1996).

Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

the endpoints of the entire 1981–1996 period were the increase in disability experienced
by the 21–25 and 51–55 age cohorts and the decrease in disability for the 41–45 age
cohort.
Figures 3 through 6 document changes in employment and wage levels by disability
status. As such, they represent the starting point for our inquiry into the labor market
effects of the ADA on the disabled population relative to nondisabled people. Figure 3
shows that between 1981 and 1996, the percentage of nondisabled individuals with jobs
remained high and relatively constant at about 90 percent, while employment in the
disabled community fell during the 1990s from a peak of nearly 60 percent in 1988 to about
52 percent by 1996. Given that the ADA was signed into law on July 26, 1990, this deterioration in the employment levels of the disabled appears to begin just prior to enactment
and continues through the early years of ADA enforcement before showing signs of reversal
after 1994. At first glance, then, this simple graphical depiction intimates that disabled
individuals may have faced increasing employment obstacles under the ADA regime, while
the nondisabled labor force was largely unaffected.
Figure 4 provides a somewhat finer measure of participation by showing the average
number of annual weeks worked over time for disabled and nondisabled individuals.22
Average weeks worked for the nondisabled remain fairly stable at about 43 weeks per year.
Disabled individuals also experienced labor supply stability through the 1980s, with an
average of 25 weeks worked and a peak of about 27 weeks in 1988. This five-month difference

22

Figures 4 and 6 only include observations through 1995 because the necessary data are not available in 1996.
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Figure 4: Average annual weeks worked by disability status (1981–1995).

Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

Figure 5: Conditional average real annual wages by disability status (1981–1996).

Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

in average annual employment between the two groups is significant in its own right.
However, despite no material change for the nondisabled in the 1990s, the gap between the
nondisabled and disabled grew substantially, with average weeks worked among the disabled
declining from 23 to 18 between 1991 and 1995.
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Figure 6: Conditional average real hourly wages by disability status (1981–1995).

Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the time series for real wages and salaries (measured in
constant 2000 dollars), showing annual earnings and earnings per annual hours worked.
Figure 5 depicts real income increases for both the disabled and nondisabled populations,
which follow the same general pattern, albeit with an unusually sharp increase for the
earnings of the disabled in 1996. Unless the 1996 jump represents some delayed ADAinduced improvement, Figure 5 provides little evidence that the ADA had any appreciable
effect on relative wages of the male household heads in our sample.
Figure 6, which plots the average hourly real wage for both groups, reveals that the
nondisabled earned about $2.30 more during the 1980s. Unlike the time path for annual
earnings, hourly wages converge substantially by 1993 but diverge in 1995.
Figures 3 through 6 offer an overall sense of the relative labor market performance
of the disabled over time, but to assess better the causal impact of the ADA, one must
control for individual characteristics that affect employment and wages and that are correlated with disability (or at least the propensity to report a disability) as well as for other
factors that may have differential impact on the disabled over time. The following section
will use our individual-level panel data to illuminate how the ADA influenced the employment and earnings of the disabled.

IV. Empirical Results
A. Employment Status
We begin our regression analysis of the ADA’s effect on labor market outcomes for
the disabled population with an empirical model for employment status. Using a
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difference-in-differences framework, we determine whether the legislation impacted
changes in the year-to-year probability that a nondisabled individual was employed relative
to a disabled person. Thus, the general empirical specification is:

Employedit = β0 + δ ∗ disit + ∑ j =82 β j −81I j ∗ disit + ∑ j =81 λ j −80 I j + εit ,
J

J

(1)

where i and t index individuals and years, respectively; Ij is an indicator for each year; J is the
maximum year of observation for the relevant dependent variable; and disit takes the value
1 when the individual is disabled and 0 otherwise. Each of the coefficients b on the 16
interaction terms represents the difference-in-differences (DD) estimator for a given year
relative to 1981. Although Equation (1) generates raw DDs, we can improve on this stark
model in two ways. First, we add a vector of covariates that influence employment outcomes.
Second, in our fully specified model, we add controls for individual fixed effects.23 This
procedure essentially differences out factors specific to each individual that remain
constant across time. The estimation process thus compares annual DDs with respect to the
individual rather than across the pooled set of records for each year. The data underlying
all regressions in this section are from the unrestricted set.
Equation (1) represents a linear specification for the difference-in-differences estimator whenever the dependent variable is continuous. The logistic equivalent to this model
without fixed effects estimates the effects of the ADA using all 18,342 individuals, while the
inclusion of fixed effects (conditional logit) reduces the sample size by about 25 percent to
13,760 persons.24
Note that the PSID employment status question identifies this status only at the time
of the PSID interview, which can lead to imprecision in our estimates.25 To understand this
point, consider a respondent A, employed from January through May, at which time she lost
her job, and respondent B, who was unemployed the entire year. A and B will be observationally equivalent with respect to the employment status question as long as A is interviewed after the May job loss. Sample attrition and the crudeness of the employment status
question prompt us to consider an alternative measure.
Table 3 displays estimates from Equation (1) when Employedit is measured as the
number of weeks worked per year. PSID interviewers generate this variable through retrospective questions; in other words, respondents reveal how many weeks they worked in year
t during an interview in year t + 1. Because these data are not available in the 1997 annual
file, the observation period ends in 1995. The first column of Table 3 shows a strong and

23

A variance inflation factor test run after each regression confirms that none of the difference-in-differences
estimates is affected by multicollinearity. We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.

24

Exactly 4,581 persons drop out of our sample when fixed effects are included because these individuals experienced
no variation in employment status across their observation span and thus do not contribute to the regression
estimates.

25

According to the PSID, “[t]he interview period (field season) is roughly between March and November, with 1993
and 1994 being exceptions and going into December.”
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Annual Weeks Worked, Unrestricted Data Set (1981–1995)

Disabled * 1982
Disabled * 1983
Disabled * 1984
Disabled * 1985
Disabled * 1986
Disabled * 1987
Disabled * 1988
Disabled * 1989
Disabled * 1990
Disabled * 1991
Disabled * 1992
Disabled * 1993
Disabled * 1994
Disabled * 1995
Covariates included?
Fixed effects?
N

1

2

3

-2.10*
(1.28)
0.18
(1.32)
0.98
(1.38)
1.07
(1.47)
-0.58
(1.57)
0.58
(1.52)
1.36
(1.55)
0.85
(1.55)
-1.89
(1.51)
-2.18
(1.53)
-1.73
(1.49)
-4.18***
(1.54)
-6.56***
(1.55)
-7.21***
(1.63)
No
No
56,400

-1.78
(1.18)
1.12
(1.24)
0.15
(1.27)
0.86
(1.37)
-1.41
(1.48)
-0.43
(1.39)
0.74
(1.43)
-0.53
(1.41)
-2.94**
(1.39)
-3.34**
(1.41)
-3.11**
(1.37)
-4.98***
(1.44)
-6.75***
(1.48)
-7.51***
(1.52)
Yes
No
55,341

-0.26
(1.02)
2.48**
(1.16)
0.99
(1.17)
0.86
(1.2)
-0.11
(1.35)
0.67
(1.32)
0.55
(1.30)
-0.50
(1.32)
-0.81
(1.29)
-1.01
(1.30)
-0.51
(1.28)
-0.93
(1.36)
-3.35**
(1.41)
-3.64**
(1.46)
Yes
Yes
55,341

Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level; *** = significant at the 1 percent
level. Column 1 coefficients are difference-in-differences estimates from Equation (1) when Employedit is measured
as weeks worked per year. Column 2 adds time-varying covariates to Equation (1), and Column 3 adds time-varying
covariates and individual fixed-effects to Equation (1). Estimates are based on the unrestricted sample, and all
standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

increasing disparity in annual weeks worked for the disabled beginning in 1993, the year
after the ADA first became effective.26 Relative to 1981, disabled workers were employed
between one and two months less than nondisabled laborers in the period 1993–1995.
Adding controls in the second column increases the magnitude of the DD estimates from

26

We focus on 1993 as an important year for observing ADA-related changes in our dependent variables because the
ADA’s first effective date was 1992 (for firms with at least 25 employees). We allow for a one-year lag to capture any
potential employment and wage effects. For similar reasons, 1995 represents another crucial observation date since
the ADA’s coverage extended to firms with at least 15 employees in 1994.
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1993 to 1995 (in absolute value) while also suggesting an earlier ADA effect dating to 1990,
the year of enactment. However, once we control for individual fixed effects, the point
estimates fall by about one-half and are significant only in 1994 and 1995. Therefore, the
regression analysis in Table 3 appears to validate the casual observation from Figure 4 that
employment levels among the disabled declined following enactment of the ADA.
In contrast to the regressions analyzing wage differentials, we do not restrict the
dependent variable in Table 3 to nonzero values. (About 7 percent of the observations used
in the unrestricted data set indicate no weeks worked.) For most empirical analyses in which
the values of the dependent variable cluster around zero, OLS yields biased coefficient
estimates. Nevertheless, because the DD methodology merely estimates differences in
averages (unadjusted in Column 1 and adjusted in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3), the
presence of zero observations does not contaminate the coefficients on the interaction
terms.
B. Annual Earnings
Section 102 of the ADA prohibits not only hiring bias against the disabled but also discrimination “against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to . . . employee compensation . . . and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.” Thus, if the law served its intended protective function, we
should not observe a significant difference between changes in relative wages. Unlike the
approach taken with annual weeks worked, we regress annual earnings on our DD interaction terms conditional on receiving positive wages. Since detecting wage discrimination
depends on comparisons of individuals receiving a nonzero wage, the empirical strategy of
Table 4 requires exclusion of zero-wage observations.
In the next two sections, we estimate the model:

Earningsit = β0 + δ ∗ disit + ∑ j =82 β j −81I j ∗ disit + ∑ j =81 λ j −80 I j + εit ,
J

J

(2)

where Earningsit represents either annual or hourly wages. As in our analysis of employment
levels, estimates for the baseline model captured by Equation (2) are given in the first
column of Table 4, while successive controls for individual time-varying characteristics and
fixed effects are added in Columns 2 and 3, respectively.
Although the signs of the point estimates in all three columns of Table 4 suggest a
relative decline in wages among the disabled, no clear and sustained pattern of ADA
influence emerges as with weeks worked. The emergence of mild statistical significance
over time contrasts sharply with the results in Table 3. Based on these estimates, the
unrestricted data do not support the proposition that the ADA caused relative wages for
disabled workers to deteriorate, although 1993 appears again to be an unusually bad year
for disabled workers. The absence of a sustained pattern in wage differentials, combined
with the positive coefficients in all three models for 1996, suggests (in keeping with
Figure 5) that the wage gap might have started closing in the mid-1990s. Whether this
narrowing trend continued into the current century cannot be determined until additional
data become available.
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Conditional Annual Wages Earned, Unrestricted Data Set (1981–1996)

Disabled * 1982
Disabled * 1983
Disabled * 1984
Disabled * 1985
Disabled * 1986
Disabled * 1987
Disabled * 1988
Disabled * 1989
Disabled * 1990
Disabled * 1991
Disabled * 1992
Disabled * 1993
Disabled * 1994
Disabled * 1995
Disabled * 1996
Covariates included?
Fixed effects?
N

1

2

3

746.34
(1,621.09)
-1,439.19
(1,559.51)
-677.34
(1,593.68)
-1,327.12
(2,081.52)
-1,466.81
(2,165.08)
-2,292.60
(1,999.33)
1,277.12
(2,969.06)
-472.67
(1,851.57)
-1,230.19
(1,638.32)
-1,305.43
(1,934.78)
2,092.27
(2,052.83)
-3,601.38*
(2,049.20)
-1,341.10
(2,094.54)
-4,185.18*
(2,164.31)
2,903.04
(5,285.71)
No
No
54,191

-250.37
(1,526.88)
-1,515.24
(1,524.29)
-2,422.66
(1,546.76)
-3,586.90*
(1,931.97)
-3,489.78*
(2,006.62)
-5,075.32***
(1,846.41)
-868.92
(2,754.10)
-3,015.72*
(1,747.91)
-2,293.60
(1,609.82)
-2,493.43
(1,767.57)
-547.28
(1,898.40)
-6,316.76***
(1,875.92)
-3,886.13*
(2,065.29)
-4,293.32**
(1,930.05)
1,553.52
(5,297.91)
Yes
No
53,049

-2,154.84
(1,514.88)
-1,345.93
(1,404.43)
-2,767.64*
(1,424.52)
-1,477.31
(2,170.44)
-3,396.85
(2,280.00)
-2,669.00
(2,258.61)
-2,713.09
(2,353.06)
-3,031.66
(2,016.83)
-1,958.07
(2,459.95)
-2,453.83
(2,314.18)
-261.97
(2,440.80)
-4,472.93*
(2,388.32)
-2,716.29
(2,395.19)
-3,075.65
(2,318.36)
478.99
(5,242.35)
Yes
Yes
53,049

Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level; *** = significant at the 1 percent
level. Column 1 coefficients are difference-in-differences estimates from Equation (2) where Earningsit is measured as
dollars per year. Column 2 adds time-varying covariates to Equation (2), and Column 3 adds time-varying covariates
and individual fixed effects to Equation (2). Estimates are based on the unrestricted sample, and all standard errors
are clustered at the individual level.
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

C. Hourly Earnings
Measurements of earnings power based solely on annual income may tell a different story
than measurements based on hourly wage rates. Dividing annual earnings by the number
of hours worked may refine our empirical understanding of earnings differences between
disabled and nondisabled workers.
As Table 5 shows, there is no evidence from our difference-in-differences estimates
that disabled persons experienced an ADA-induced change in relative hourly wages.
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Conditional Hourly Wages Earned, Unrestricted Data Set (1981–1995)

Disabled * 1982
Disabled * 1983
Disabled * 1984
Disabled * 1985
Disabled * 1986
Disabled * 1987
Disabled * 1988
Disabled * 1989
Disabled * 1990
Disabled * 1991
Disabled * 1992
Disabled * 1993
Disabled * 1994
Disabled * 1995
Covariates included?
Fixed effects?
N

1

2

3

0.65
(1.10)
-0.76
(0.84)
0.37
(1.02)
-0.06
(1.05)
-0.14
(1.14)
-1.27
(1.07)
1.55
(1.72)
-0.11
(1.13)
-0.62
(0.82)
-0.93
(0.99)
-0.18
(1.94)
2.34
(3.09)
1.52
(1.45)
-1.73
(2.10)
No
No
45,259

0.42
(1.10)
-1.02
(0.83)
-0.40
(1.03)
-1.31
(1.00)
-1.02
(1.06)
-1.98**
(1.01)
0.75
(1.62)
-0.85
(1.09)
-0.76
(0.81)
-1.27
(0.95)
-1.07
(1.93)
1.64
(3.08)
1.40
(1.50)
-1.64
(2.06)
Yes
No
44,469

-0.79
(1.10)
-1.45*
(0.78)
-0.74
(0.97)
-0.36
(1.32)
-1.08
(1.29)
-1.35
(1.40)
-0.11
(1.44)
-1.30
(1.29)
-0.94
(1.29)
-1.69
(1.41)
-0.03
(1.67)
1.44
(3.84)
0.19
(1.83)
-1.19
(2.33)
Yes
Yes
44,469

Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level; *** = significant at the 1 percent
level. Column 1 coefficients are difference-in-differences estimates from Equation (2) where Earningsit is measured as
dollars per hour. Column 2 adds time-varying covariates to Equation (2), and Column 3 adds time-varying covariates
and individual fixed effects to Equation (2). Estimates are based on the unrestricted sample, and all standard errors
are clustered at the individual level.
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

Consistent with a pattern observed earlier in Figure 6, the disabled experienced a notable
(albeit short-lived) hourly wage increase relative to the nondisabled in 1993. Although this
was the largest change in absolute value over the entire observation period, the 1993
change was still not statistically significant in any of the three models.
The evidence in this section is consistent with the following conclusions. First,
the ADA had a negative impact on the employment levels of the disabled relative to the
nondisabled. The fact that our data extend back to the early 1980s helps rule out the
possibility that the employment declines that we observe (and that were found in other
recent studies) originated prior to the adoption of the ADA. Second, the ADA did not cause
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any appreciable decline in the wages of disabled workers (relative to the nondisabled). In
other words, it would appear that the ADA did not induce a simple adverse shift in the
demand for disabled workers, since this would result in both a decline in employment and
a reduction in the wages of disabled workers. Rather, the initial evidence from our unrestricted sample would be consistent with a story in which, perhaps most notably when the
ADA took effect in 1993, employers were particularly wary of disabled workers (perhaps out
of concern that the law would impose onerous burdens on employers), but that disabled
workers who did secure employment retained their previous level of hourly wages. In the
next section, we consider whether these tentative conclusions remain robust when we
eliminate compositional changes in the sample of workers.

V. Analyzing the Restricted Sample
In this section, we restrict the data to include only those individuals who appear each year
for the entire observation period. In Section IV, the baseline regressions without individual
fixed effects counted persons regardless of whether they appeared in the reference year
1981. Thus, for example, the difference-in-differences estimate for 1994 may have been
calculated using information on an interview respondent who first appeared in 1988.
Consequently, the logic of the regression exercise would be confounded by this compositional change, especially if the individuals appearing after 1981 significantly altered the
relative numbers of disabled persons in the data. The inclusion of individual fixed effects
in the most fully specified model ameliorated the “anchoring” problem by requiring that all
individuals appear in 1981. Otherwise, the regression would drop the entire set of observations for that person. Still, the unrestricted data permitted potentially troublesome
compositional changes as some workers dropped out of the sample over time. For example,
even if two individuals, A and B, initially appeared continuously from 1981, but B contributed to estimates for three more years than A because B was interviewed three more times
than A, estimates from those three years would not be fully comparable with the preceding
results. The restricted data set precludes compositional change by including only those
persons that appear for the same (maximum) duration. As discussed in Section III, the
restricted sample contains the employment and wage histories of 1,437 PSID respondents
from 1981 to 1996, of whom 553 were identified as “disabled” for at least one year during
the 16 years of data.
The first column of Table 6 initially suggests an even more robust decline in disabled
employment levels than Table 3, as the magnitudes of the last three estimates in Column 1
range from -5.7 to -8.6, but this story changes dramatically when one adds demographic
covariates (Column 2) or controls for individual fixed effects (Column 3). Thus, if one
accepts the proposition that the restricted data set permits cleaner comparisons of individuals across time, that is, it maximizes the value of the PSID’s longitudinal structure,
particularly when controlling for individual fixed effects, then Table 6 provides persuasive
evidence against a depressive employment effect from the ADA. Moreover, the vast majority
of point estimates (11 of 14) in Column 3 are positively signed, though not statistically
significant at standard levels. This result suggests that, at least relative to 1981, male disabled
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Annual Weeks Worked, Restricted Data Set (1981–1995)

Disabled * 1982
Disabled * 1983
Disabled * 1984
Disabled * 1985
Disabled * 1986
Disabled * 1987
Disabled * 1988
Disabled * 1989
Disabled * 1990
Disabled * 1991
Disabled * 1992
Disabled * 1993
Disabled * 1994
Disabled * 1995
Covariates included?
Fixed effects?
N

1

2

3

-0.72
(3.04)
-0.40
(3.06)
1.31
(2.93)
-0.76
(3.33)
-3.82
(3.64)
-0.01
(3.20)
-0.57
(3.10)
0.08
(2.93)
-5.12
(3.27)
-6.32*
(3.36)
-1.51
(3.21)
-5.66*
(3.30)
-8.35**
(3.52)
-8.62**
(3.62)
No
No
8,938

-1.20
(2.98)
-0.10
(3.02)
1.87
(2.93)
0.18
(3.47)
-2.53
(3.81)
1.55
(3.34)
1.99
(3.32)
3.24
(3.27)
-1.26
(3.62)
-2.06
(3.80)
2.85
(3.67)
0.36
(3.95)
-2.19
(4.28)
-0.16
(4.47)
Yes
No
8,912

0.98
(2.59)
2.17
(2.77)
2.71
(2.49)
0.78
(3.11)
-0.78
(3.34)
2.86
(3.06)
3.07
(2.74)
3.70
(2.76)
0.21
(3.00)
-1.51
(3.10)
2.48
(2.95)
1.54
(3.28)
-1.11
(3.52)
1.36
(3.70)
Yes
Yes
8,912

Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level; *** = significant at the 1 percent
level. Column 1 coefficients are difference-in-differences estimates from Equation (1) when Employedit is measured as
weeks worked per year. Column 2 adds time-varying covariates to Equation (1), and Column 3 adds time-varying
covariates and individual fixed effects to Equation (1). Estimates are based on the restricted sample, and all standard
errors are clustered at the individual level.
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

household heads were not suffering employment losses (even if there may be some indication from Table 6 that any improvements were weakening in the 1990s).
Table 7 examines the impact of the ADA on annual earnings for the restricted sample
and finds, as was the case in the unrestricted sample, that there are no consistent patterns
of change in the relative wages of disabled workers that can be confidently ascribed to the
ADA. Once again, 1993 stands out as an unusually bad year for the disabled, with earnings
shortfalls (relative to 1981) ranging from $10,000 (Column 1) to $5,000 (Column 3).
With the large year-to-year swings in the various estimated effects and the generally statistically insignificant coefficients, though, the conclusions one can draw from
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Conditional Annual Wages Earned, Restricted Data Set (1981–1996)

Disabled * 1982
Disabled * 1983
Disabled * 1984
Disabled * 1985
Disabled * 1986
Disabled * 1987
Disabled * 1988
Disabled * 1989
Disabled * 1990
Disabled * 1991
Disabled * 1992
Disabled * 1993
Disabled * 1994
Disabled * 1995
Disabled * 1996
Covariates included?
Fixed effects?
N

1

2

3

39.15
(2,961.84)
-4,719.64*
(2,758.93)
-2,745.25
(2,583.90)
-7,072.15**
(3,431.43)
-5,275.17
(3,801.62)
-8,634.13**
(3,750.00)
-7,146.01*
(4,111.81)
-4,471.59
(3,375.95)
-5,970.43*
(3,230.28)
-8,632.74**
(3,717.52)
-5,749.60
(4,376.94)
-10,357.58**
(4,126.61)
-4,135.76
(4,660.38)
-9,655.74**
(4,548.16)
-5,379.76
(4,367.12)
No
No
19,762

-1,052.64
(2,772.77)
-4,221.60
(2,739.45)
-2,610.32
(2,715.76)
-5,604.07*
(3,038.50)
-2,668.13
(3,500.84)
-6,209.00*
(3,318.33)
-5,002.83
(3,691.88)
-2,798.21
(3,315.48)
-2,613.86
(3,351.33)
-5,330.25
(3,413.56)
-5,105.32
(4,270.72)
-7,234.62*
(3,823.49)
-911.29
(4,592.39)
-5,885.46
(4,355.23)
-3,067.75
(4,586.23)
Yes
No
19,648

-2,782.06
(2,332.88)
-1,714.85
(2,068.69)
-1,746.00
(2,073.51)
-1,348.42
(4,222.21)
-1,348.96
(4,160.80)
-3,076.81
(4,332.98)
-2,901.21
(4,345.29)
-4,129.82
(3,694.59)
-2,326.68
(4,784.707)
-3,546.62
(4,074.81)
-3,621.80
(4,546.63)
-5,256.63
(4,295.34)
-1,517.86
(4,131.87)
-4,675.97
(3,755.64)
-5,261.67
(4,574.79)
Yes
Yes
19,648

Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level; *** = significant at the 1 percent
level. Column 1 coefficients are difference-in-differences estimates from Equation (2) where Earningsit is measured as
dollars per year. Column 2 adds time-varying covariates to Equation (2), and Column 3 adds time-varying covariates
and individual fixed effects to Equation (2). Estimates are based on the unrestricted sample, and all standard errors
are clustered at the individual level.
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

Table 7 are uncertain. On one hand, the poor outcomes in 1993 suggest a story in
which the ADA damaged the earnings profile for the disabled by a substantial amount.
A year later, however, circumstances seemed to improve substantially. Might this suggest that employer fears about the possible costs of the ADA initially caused them to
shun disabled workers, but that this initial effect was quickly overturned? On the other
hand, the return to substantial (though insignificant) disparities in 1995 and 1996
may suggest that 1994 was simply an outlier. Still, 1996 does not look all that different
from 1987 in terms of the relative earnings of the disabled, which may suggest that
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Figure 7: Number disabled in the restricted sample by year (1981–1996).

Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

forces other than the ADA primarily drove the apparent deterioration in the earnings of
the disabled.
One explanation for why the Column 1 estimates in Table 7 display a significant
downward wage effect, while Column 3 does not, might be differential self-reports of
disability status over time. Figure 7 plots the number of individuals reporting a disability
among the 532 people in the restricted sample who reported a disability at least once but
not for the entire observation period. Among these individuals, we do observe changes in
self-identification that may have been influenced by the ADA’s passage (or modifications to
Social Security and other transfer payments). Since our constant restricted sample naturally
ages over time, the overall trend in the number reporting a disability increases as one might
expect. However, with the exception of the 1986–1987 change (which should be discounted
because of data reporting problems in 1986), the 1992–1993 increase represents the largest
jump in our data. In fact, from 1993 through 1996, the number never drops below 200,
which is 38 percent of the 532 “sometimes-disabled” population. This post-1992 spike might
be attributed to hopes that the ADA would benefit people who claim a disability. Thus,
when we control for individual fixed effects in Column 3, we capture the probable fact that
those reporting a disability have better outcomes overall regardless of whether they claim to
be disabled in a given year.
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Conditional Hourly Wages Earned, Restricted Data Set (1981–1995)

Disabled * 1982
Disabled * 1983
Disabled * 1984
Disabled * 1985
Disabled * 1986
Disabled * 1987
Disabled * 1988
Disabled * 1989
Disabled * 1990
Disabled * 1991
Disabled * 1992
Disabled * 1993
Disabled * 1994
Disabled * 1995
Covariates included?
Fixed effects?
N

1

2

3

0.01
(2.07)
-2.30
(1.71)
1.08
(3.33)
0.19
(2.32)
-2.72
(2.66)
-2.15
(1.99)
-0.90
(2.41)
-2.62
(1.94)
-2.89
(1.87)
0.62
(2.97)
-3.58
(2.29)
-5.44**
(2.46)
-3.91
(2.68)
1.59
(9.48)
No
No
7,194

-0.64
(2.06)
-2.59
(1.64)
0.40
(3.25)
-1.22
(2.28)
-2.63
(2.48)
-2.71
(1.87)
-1.24
(2.33)
-3.12
(1.95)
-3.52*
(1.93)
1.30
(2.89)
-3.65
(2.29)
-6.30**
(2.48)
-4.50
(2.74)
0.82
(9.21)
Yes
No
7,169

-1.25
(2.33)
-3.37
(2.16)
-0.72
(2.90)
-0.79
(2.18)
-4.27**
(1.92)
-5.26***
(1.90)
-2.88
(2.55)
-4.48**
(2.24)
-5.03**
(2.31)
-2.96
(2.60)
-6.34**
(2.98)
-6.54**
(2.90)
-6.22*
(3.26)
0.38
(8.32)
Yes
Yes
7,169

Notes: * = significant at the 10 percent level; ** = significant at the 5 percent level; *** = significant at the 1 percent
level. Column 1 coefficients are difference-in-differences estimates from Equation (2) where Earningsit is measured as
dollars per hour. Column 2 adds time-varying covariates to Equation (2), and Column 3 adds time-varying covariates
and individual fixed effects to Equation (2). Estimates are based on the restricted sample, and all standard errors are
clustered at the individual level.
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

Table 8 estimates the hourly wage effects of the ADA, again using the restricted
sample. While the unrestricted data yielded no evidence of a sustained ADA impact on the
hourly wages of the disabled, the same regressions estimated on the restricted set do suggest
an adverse ADA impact on hourly wages (note again the negative estimate in 1993). But
when one looks at the timing of these wage shifts, the link to the ADA becomes less clear.
For example, controlling for individual fixed effects in Column 3 reveals an adverse trend
in hourly wages for the disabled, but one that begins in 1986, well before the ADA became
law. While relative real hourly wages of the disabled fell by about $6 beginning in 1992, such
disparity first appears in 1986 as a $4 shortfall relative to the nondisabled in 1981. Since
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the series of negative point estimates remains rather consistent from the pre-ADA period
through 1994, we cannot readily attribute the decline in hourly wages to the legislation
itself. Moreover, though one might conclude that the early days of the ADA did not boost
the hourly wages of the disabled, the estimates for 1995 suggest some positive news regarding earnings. Might this suggest that a decade of earnings erosion for the disabled, initially
caused by forces in the U.S. labor market other than the ADA, was beginning to reverse in
1995, or is this just another ephemeral swing?

VI. Conclusion
This article has offered new evidence on the relationship between the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the labor market fortunes of the class protected by its landmark
provisions. Using individual-level longitudinal data from 1981 to 1996 from the PSID, a
previously unexamined source, we examine the annual number of weeks worked, annual
earnings, and hourly wages on a full sample of 7,120 unique male household heads
between the ages of 21 and 65 (a total of 64,607 person-year observations) and a
“restricted” sample of 1,437 individuals appearing each year from 1981 to 1996. The
conflicting pictures that emerge from the analyses of these two different samples shed
new light on, but also counsels caution in reaching final conclusions about, the economic
impact of the ADA.
Our analysis of the unrestricted sample suggested the ADA had a negative impact on
the employment levels of the disabled relative to the nondisabled but no impact on relative
earnings; however, our evaluation of the restricted sample raised questions about these
findings. For the restricted sample—in which we look at the identical 1,437 workers over
our entire sample period—we see little evidence of adverse effects on weeks worked in our
individual fixed effects model, but strong evidence of wage decline for the disabled, albeit
one that began in 1986, well prior to the adoption of the ADA.
The restricted data set enables us to see how the identical set of 1,437 workers fare
over our 1981–1996 data period. Recall that 884 of these workers were never disabled over
this timeframe, 21 were always disabled, and the remaining 532 workers move in and out of
what the PSID identifies as a “disabled” condition. The restricted sample has the considerable advantage of protecting against biases caused by law-induced changes in self-identified
disability status, but this benefit comes with two costs. First, the relatively small sample size
necessarily generates higher standard errors in our restricted sample estimates that make it
hard to distinguish statistically insignificant effects from true noneffects. Second, by focusing on more mature workers at the time of ADA enactment, we miss what is happening to
new entrants to the labor market. Thus, workers who already have jobs (or at least more job
experience) when the ADA comes into effect may be in a different position than those
coming into the labor market for the first time.
Our analysis also underscores once again the difficult employment situation confronted by the average male household head with a disability, one that, at least given our
admittedly imprecisely measured definition of disability, has not seen major and sustained improvements during the post-ADA years. On the other hand, this article provides
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evidence that the more mature workers who were found in every year of our sample did not
suffer the same dis-employment effects that previous empirical analyses have attributed to
the ADA.
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